Manufacturers' Competition and Subsidies to Suppliers
Adam A. Wadecki
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business
Owen Q. Wu
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
March 22, 2010
Frequently, manufacturers experience supply disruptions due to supplier bankruptcies. Manufacturers can increase supplier reliability by providing suppliers subsidies in excess of suppliers' production costs. We examine the optimal subsidy decisions of manufacturers in four supply chain structures. These structures differ along two dimensions: competition among manufacturers and manufacturers' use of dedicated or shared suppliers. Manufacturer-provided subsidies serve to improve the supplier's financial state. Manufacturers compete with one another in the Cournot sense. We find that competing manufacturers face an important tradeoff. By sharing suppliers, manufacturers enjoy decreased subsidy costs because they reap the benefit of competitor-provided subsidies. On the other hand, by using dedicated suppliers, manufacturers may become monopolists when their competitor's supplier defaults. We find (i) suppliers receive less subsidies when manufacturers compete; (ii) increases in the intensity of competition increases among manufacturers lead to lower subsidies provided to suppliers and decreased supplier reliability; (iii) consumers always prefer manufacturer-level competition; (iv) manufacturer-level subsidy costs are less when manufacturers share suppliers; and, (v) the amount of subsidies received by suppliers (and hence, their reliability) is dependent on the spread between prots in a monopoly environment and an oligopoly environment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: Supply Risk, Competition, Shared Supplier, Subsidiesworking papers series
Date posted: May 28, 2010
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