Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts

Abstract:     
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms’ first proxy disclosures under the SEC’s 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, we find that 25.44 percent of our sample firms explicitly use RPE in setting executive compensation. We demonstrate that a lack of knowledge of both actual peer group composition and the link between RPE-based performance targets and future peer performance significantly hinder the traditional implicit test from detecting RPE use. We also find that firms consider both costs and benefits of RPE as an incentive mechanism when deciding to use RPE. Finally, both efficient contracting and rent extraction considerations influence RPE peer selection and the relative importance of these competing considerations depends on RPE firms’ performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: executive compensation, relative performance evaluation, peer group, SEC regulation

JEL Classification: J33, J44, M41, M52

working papers series