Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1620551
 
 

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Boards of Banks


Daniel Ferreira


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Tom Kirchmaier


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group (FMG)

Daniel Metzger


Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group

October 16, 2010

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 289/2010

Abstract:     
We show that country characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for the fraction of outside bank directors with experience in the banking industry. Exploiting the time-series dimension of the sample, we show that changes in bank characteristics are not robustly associated with changes in board independence, while changes in board experience are positively related to changes in bank size and negatively related to changes in performance. The evidence suggests that country-specific laws and regulations affect the composition of boards of banks mainly through requirements for director independence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Boards, Directors, Bank Governance

JEL Classification: G34

working papers series


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Date posted: June 5, 2010 ; Last revised: November 3, 2012

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Kirchmaier, Tom and Metzger, Daniel, Boards of Banks (October 16, 2010). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 289/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1620551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1620551

Contact Information

Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Tom Kirchmaier
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )
Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group (FMG) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 852 3588 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://fmg.lse.ac.uk
Daniel Metzger
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
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