Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623422
 
 

Citations



 


 



Regulation of Entry and the Distortion of Industrial Organization


Raymond J. Fisman


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Virginia Sarria-Allende


IAE Business School - Universidad Austral

May 2010

Journal of Applied Economics. Vol 13, No. 1, pp. 91-111, May 2010

Abstract:     
We study the distortions of industrial organization caused by entry regulation. We take advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether industries are differentially affected in countries according to entry regulation. First, we consider the effect of entry regulation on the (static) industry structure. We find that regulation has a greater impact in industries with lower natural barriers to entry, both on the number of firms and on the average size of firms. We find that the effect of entry regulation on industry share is not related to differences in natural barriers. Regarding industry dynamics, we find that in countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, growth opportunities lead to the creation of new firms; finally, the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation.

Keywords: regulation, regulation of entry

JEL Classification: O14, K20, L11, L50

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 12, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Fisman, Raymond J. and Sarria-Allende, Virginia, Regulation of Entry and the Distortion of Industrial Organization (May 2010). Journal of Applied Economics. Vol 13, No. 1, pp. 91-111, May 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623422

Contact Information

Raymond Fisman
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-5553 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Virginia Sarria-Allende (Contact Author)
IAE Business School - Universidad Austral ( email )
Buenos Aires
Argentina
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 347
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.297 seconds