The Market for CEOs: An Empirical Analysis
Varouj A. Aivazian
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management
Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics
Mohammad M. Rahaman
Saint Mary's University - Sobey School of Business
June 27, 2012
We investigate empirically a market-based explanation for the rise in recent years in external CEO hiring and compensation. Consistent with the market-based theory, we find that firms in industries relying on general managerial skills are more likely to hire CEOs externally than firms in industries relying less on such skills. We show that firms relying on internal CEOs have on average higher profits than external-CEO firms and that the difference in profits decreases as general skills become more important in the industry. We relate managerial skills to compensation and show that CEO general skills induce better firm performance and higher compensation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: CEO Turnover, CEO Skills, CEO Compensation, General Skills
JEL Classification: G30, J40working papers series
Date posted: June 14, 2010 ; Last revised: July 6, 2012
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