Uncertainty About Government Policy and Stock Prices

54 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2010

See all articles by Lubos Pastor

Lubos Pastor

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Pietro Veronesi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: June 15, 2010

Abstract

We analyze how changes in government policy affect stock prices. Our general equilibrium model features uncertainty about government policy and a government that has both economic and non-economic motives. The government tends to change its policy after performance downturns in the private sector. Stock prices fall at the announcements of policy changes, on average. The price fall is expected to be large if uncertainty about government policy is large, as well as if the policy change is preceded by a short or shallow downturn. Policy changes increase volatility, risk premia, and correlations among stocks. The jump risk premium associated with policy decisions is positive, on average.

Suggested Citation

Pastor, Lubos and Veronesi, Pietro, Uncertainty About Government Policy and Stock Prices (June 15, 2010). MFI Working Paper No. 2010-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1625845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1625845

Lubos Pastor (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ChicagoGSB.edu/fac/lubos.pastor/

Pietro Veronesi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-6348 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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