IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets - A Political Economy Analysis
DIW Berlin; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Julien P. M. Reynaud
International Monetary Fund (IMF); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
June 17, 2010
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3089
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in ‘defensive surveillance’.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: IMF, surveillance, political economy, sovereign spreads, financial markets, emerging market economies
JEL Classification: F33, F30, F40working papers series
Date posted: June 20, 2010
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