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Subprime Crisis and Board (In)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks in Germany


Harald Hau


University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute; Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Marcel P. Thum


Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) - Ifo Institute for Economic Research

June 21, 2010

INSEAD Working Paper No. 2010/45/FIN

Abstract:     
We examine evidence for a systematic underperformance of Germany's state-owned banks in the current financial crisis and study if the bank losses can be traced to the quality of bank governance. For this purpose, we examine the biographical background of 593 supervisory board members in the 29 largest banks and find a pronounced difference in the finance and management experience of board representatives across private and state-owned banks. Measures of "boardroom competence" are then related directly to the magnitude of bank losses in the recent financial crisis. Our data confirms that supervisory board (in)competence in finance is related to losses in the financial crisis. Improved bank governance is therefore a suitable policy objective to reduce bank fragility.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Governance, Supervisory Boards, Banking, Financial Crisis

JEL Classification: G2, G21, G3, G32

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Date posted: June 21, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hau, Harald and Thum, Marcel P., Subprime Crisis and Board (In)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks in Germany (June 21, 2010). INSEAD Working Paper No. 2010/45/FIN. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1627921 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1627921

Contact Information

Harald Hau (Contact Author)
University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute ( email )
40, Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
CH 1211 Geneva 4
Geneva
Switzerland
Swiss Finance Institute
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Marcel Thum
Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )
Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) - Ifo Institute for Economic Research ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany
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