Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=162811
 
 

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Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law


Emerson H. Tiller


Northwestern University - School of Law

Pablo T. Spiller


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group


Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1999

Abstract:     
This article presents models of strategic behavior by agencies and courts where the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy choices from higher level review. The theory is based on the notion that decision instruments (for example, rulemaking and adjudication for agencies, statutory interpretation and reasoning process review for courts) pose differential costs and payoffs for both the initiating and reviewing actors, each of whom have resource constraints. Because the initiating actor has the choice among instruments to make a decision (and to which a higher level reviewing actor is tied), the initiating actor can manipulate decision costs in a strategic fashion (choosing high-cost instruments to discourage higher level review, in particular). This article adds new insight into how judges and agencies engage in strategic decision making.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 20, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Tiller, Emerson H. and Spiller, Pablo T., Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=162811

Contact Information

Emerson H. Tiller (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
Pablo T. Spiller
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)
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