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Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate PolicyHilary SigmanRutgers University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) June 2010 NBER Working Paper No. w16121 Abstract: This chapter applies recent research on environmental enforcement to a potential U.S. program to control greenhouse gases, especially through emission trading. Climate policies present the novel problem of integrating emissions reductions that are relatively easy to monitor (such as carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels) with those that may be very difficult to monitor (such as some emissions of other greenhouse gases). The paper documents the heterogeneity in monitoring costs across different parts of current carbon markets. It argues that a broad emission trading system that includes more difficult-to-enforce components can provide less incentive to violate the law than a narrower program; thus, the government may not find it more costly to assure compliance with a broader program. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17 working papers seriesDate posted: June 29, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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