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Priming Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games


Michalis Drouvelis


University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Robert Metcalfe


Imperial College London

Nattavudh Powdthavee


University of Warwick


IZA Discussion Paper No. 4963

Abstract:     
Research on public goods mainly focuses its attention on the ability of incentives, beliefs and group structure to affect behaviour in social dilemma interactions. This paper investigates the pure effects of a rather subtle mechanism on social preferences in a one-shot linear public good game. Using priming techniques from social psychology, we activate the concept of cooperation and explore the extent to which this intervention brings about changes in peopleメs voluntary contributions to the public good and self-reported emotional responses. Our findings suggest that priming cooperation increases contribution levels, controlling for subjects' gender. Our priming effect is much stronger for females than for males. This difference can be explained by a shift in subjects' beliefs about contributions. We also find a significant impact of priming on mean positive emotional responses.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: priming, contributions, beliefs, emotional responses, public goods experiments

JEL Classification: C92, D01, H41

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Date posted: June 29, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Drouvelis, Michalis, Metcalfe, Robert and Powdthavee, Nattavudh, Priming Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4963. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1631098

Contact Information

Michalis Drouvelis (Contact Author)
University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/michalisdrouvelis/
Robert Metcalfe
Imperial College London ( email )
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
Nattavudh Powdthavee
University of Warwick ( email )
Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom
+44 (0)2476 528240 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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