Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632146
 
 

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Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries


Thomas Stratmann


George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Ernesto Crivelli


International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Adam Leive


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

June 2010

IMF Working Paper No. 10/147

Abstract:     
Government spending on health has grown as a percent of GDP over the last 40 years in industrialized countries. Widespread decentralization of healthcare systems has often accompanied this increase in spending. In this paper, we explore the effect of soft budget constraints on subnational health spending in a sample of OECD countries. We find countries where subnational governments rely primarily on central government financing and enjoy large borrowing autonomy have higher healthcare spending than those with more restrictions on subnational government borrowing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

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Date posted: June 29, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stratmann, Thomas and Crivelli, Ernesto and Leive, Adam, Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries (June 2010). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-26, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632146

Contact Information

Thomas Stratmann (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )
124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ernesto Crivelli
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States
Adam Leive
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
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