Botnet Economics and Devising Defence Schemes from Attackers’ Own Reward Processes: A Case with Use of Game Theory
Copenhagen Business School (CBS); Rotterdam School of Management; L.M. Ericsson; GIBS
April 30, 2010
This paper focuses on botnet economics and design of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce information on the attackers’ business models, with rational economic analysis of these business processes, one can identify some qualitative guidance on additional economic defense mechanisms which the target can implement, often in a cheaper way. After a short survey of game theory in the security area, is presented a real case of an Internet casino. This leads to develop a model, applicable to this case but of much more general nature, which is presented first qualitatively then quantitatively. This allows carrying out different analyses based on different equilibrium or termination principles; the ones studied are reward break-even analysis, and Max-Min analysis from game theory, for the target and the attackers. On that basis, a number of specific economic and information led defense strategies are identified which can be further studied using the model and specific adaptations to other data or cases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15
Keywords: Botnets, Economics, Game theory, Internet casino, Cyber defense
JEL Classification: C7, D18, K42, L83, O3working papers series
Date posted: July 1, 2010
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