Owning Up to the Environment

Farber, Daniel A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1633014

Abstract

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Owning Up to the Environment

Daniel A. Farber

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

June 30, 2010

UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1633014

Abstract:
This essay argues that, rather than being a constitutional bulwark against environmental regulation, certain kinds of property rights can actually ease constitutional barriers created by current Supreme Court doctrine. These environmental property rights (EPRs) are either rights to prevent environmental degradation (such as conservation easements) or limited rights to impair the environment (such as tradable pollution permits.) Among other possible benefits, these property rights may help nudge constitutional law in a more environmentally friendly direction in the areas of standing, takings, and the federal commerce power.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: environmental property rights, cap and trade, tradable permits, public trust doctrine, conservation trust

JEL Classification: K11, Q20

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Date posted: July 2, 2010 ; Last revised: July 4, 2010

Suggested Citation

Farber, Daniel A., Owning Up to the Environment (June 30, 2010). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1633014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633014 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633014

Contact Information

Daniel A. Farber (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall
Room 894
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0340 (Phone)
510-642-3728 (Fax)