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Does Reputation Discipline Big 4 Audit Firms?


Yanmin Gao


City University of Hong Kong - College of Business

Karim Jamal


University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems

Qiliang Liu


Wuhan University - School of Economics and Management

Le Luo


Peking University - Guanghua School of Management

January 28, 2011

CAAA Annual Conference 2011
University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-1006

Abstract:     
Audit quality is thought to occur primarily due to litigation pressure. We report results from a study conducted in a low litigation environment (China) where a Big 4 audit firm (Deloitte) failed to detect a fraud involving a public company (Kelon). We find that Deloitte’s clients have negative abnormal returns of 4.4% at events pertaining to Kelon, and there is a spillover to clients of other Big 4 audit firms (negative abnormal returns of 1.2%) though these negative market reactions are moderated by strong corporate governance. Deloitte loses clients to local audit firms, and all Big 4 firms lose market share in the IPO market. Our results support a reputation rationale for audit quality, and also show contagion among Big 4 audit firms, and vulnerability of Big 4 firms to loss of clients to non Big 4 firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: auditor reputation, fraud, corporate governance, contagion

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Date posted: July 4, 2010 ; Last revised: June 12, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gao, Yanmin, Jamal, Karim, Liu, Qiliang and Luo, Le, Does Reputation Discipline Big 4 Audit Firms? (January 28, 2011). CAAA Annual Conference 2011; University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-1006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633724

Contact Information

Yanmin Gao
City University of Hong Kong - College of Business ( email )
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Karim Jamal (Contact Author)
University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems ( email )
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5829 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Qiliang Liu
Wuhan University - School of Economics and Management ( email )
Wu Han, Hu-Bai 430072
China
Le Luo
Peking University - Guanghua School of Management ( email )
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China
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