Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1634292
 


 



British Directors’ Accountability vs. American CEOs’ Primacy


Simon Kinsella


University of Reading - Henley Business School

Giampiero Favato


Kingston University

July 3, 2010


Abstract:     
Although both approaches to corporate governance tackle the fundamental principal-agent problem, a basic comparative analysis of the British Codes and the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act reveals a relevant normative asymmetry. While the British regulations have been historically more prescriptive with the responsibilities of Executive and Non-Executive Directors, the American norms seem to point more clearly at the CEO and CFO as the ultimate responsible for corporate governance liabilities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Corporate, Governance, Liability, Accounatbility, Director, CEO

JEL Classification: G3, G38

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Date posted: July 4, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Kinsella, Simon and Favato, Giampiero, British Directors’ Accountability vs. American CEOs’ Primacy (July 3, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1634292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634292

Contact Information

Simon Kinsella
University of Reading - Henley Business School ( email )
Greenlands
Reading, Henley on Thames RG6 6AH
United Kingdom
Giampiero Favato (Contact Author)
Kingston University ( email )
Kingston Hill
Kingston upon Thames
Surrey KT2 7LB
United Kingdom
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