Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation
University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management
University of Cologne; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5020
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: performance measurement, forced distribution, motivation, experiment
JEL Classification: C91, D83, J33, M52working papers series
Date posted: July 6, 2010
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