Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635662
 


 



Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors


Simon C. Y. Wong


Northwestern University School of Law; London School of Economics


Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, pp. 406-411, July/August 2010
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 10-28

Abstract:     
As the dominant owners of listed companies in many developed markets, institutional investors have been under increasing pressure to act as responsible shareholders. In the UK, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and other markets, stewardship codes have been developed or are under consideration to encourage pension funds, insurance companies, and their asset managers to monitor and engage investee companies actively with the view to protect and enhance shareholder value.

However, attempts in recent decades to convince institutional investors to act as active, long-term oriented “stewards” have fallen short. This is because modern investment management practices and characteristics – such as financial arrangements that promote trading, excessive portfolio diversification, lengthening share ownership chain, misguided interpretation of fiduciary duty, and flawed business model and governance approach of passive funds – make genuine stewardship challenging for institutional investors.

Although these deficiencies are extremely serious, they may be remedied through a combination of actions, including by eliminating unnecessary intermediation, developing in-house investment management capabilities, revamping performance metrics, and rationalizing portfolio holdings.

While not all investors need to be stewards and stewardship obligations should be allowed to be discharged in different ways, tackling the underlying structural impediments will make it easier – and more natural – for asset owners and asset managers to adopt an active, long-term oriented mindset.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: stewardship code, institutional investors, shareholder responsibility, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G22, G23, G34, G38

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Date posted: July 9, 2010 ; Last revised: December 14, 2010

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y., Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors. Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, pp. 406-411, July/August 2010 ; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 10-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635662

Contact Information

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)
Northwestern University School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
HOME PAGE: http://twitter.com/SimonCYWong
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm
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