Abstract

 
 

References (92)



 


 



I.T., Repeated Contracts and the Number of Suppliers


Sinan Aral


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences

Yannis Bakos


New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences

Erik Brynjolfsson


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

August 13, 2012

Forthcoming, Management Science

Abstract:     
Many theories address how IT affects the number of suppliers and supply chain governance. However, their predictions are at times contradictory and there is relatively little empirical evidence with which to evaluate them. We therefore develop an integrated, multi-period model of the optimal number of suppliers that combines search and coordination theory, transaction cost economics, and incomplete contracts theory, and we assess our theoretical predictions using a large new dataset on the global IT sourcing decisions of 1355 firms in 12 countries. Our empirical results support three key predictions about trust, IT and supply base size. First, investments in coordination IT, which reduce search and coordination costs, are correlated with using more suppliers, while use of vendor-specific IT is associated with fewer suppliers. Second, repeated relationships and trust play a major role in supply chain governance. As firms work with fewer suppliers they also engage in more repeated relationships. At the same time asset specificity and the need to induce relationship-specific investments are correlated not only with fewer suppliers, but also with a larger fraction of repeated relationships. Third, supply chain governance differs in human capital-intensive and physical capital-intensive industries. The correspondence between asset specificity and repetition is strong in physical capital-intensive firms and not significant in human capital-intensive firms, while the correspondence between fewer suppliers and more repeated relationships is strong in human capital-intensive firms but not significant in physical capital-intensive firms. This corroborates the differential implications of human and physical capital for bargaining power, contractual risk and trust in buyer-supplier relationships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Buyer-Supplier Relationships, Optimal Number of Suppliers, Transaction Cost Economics, Incomplete Contracts, Coordination Theory, Search Costs, IT Outsourcing, IT Vendors

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 7, 2010 ; Last revised: November 17, 2012

Suggested Citation

Aral, Sinan, Bakos, Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik, I.T., Repeated Contracts and the Number of Suppliers (August 13, 2012). Forthcoming, Management Science. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1635891

Contact Information

Sinan Aral (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/sinana/www/

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-369
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences
44 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
Yannis Bakos
New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences ( email )
44 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0841 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos
Erik Brynjolfsson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E53-313
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-4319 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://digital.mit.edu/erik
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,006
Downloads: 234
Download Rank: 63,653
References:  92

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.453 seconds