Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
Université de Rennes I; M@rsouin
National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Institute of Economic Theory and Analysis (GATE); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5034
In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others' output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: status seeking, rank, competitive preferences, experiment
JEL Classification: C91, C92, M54, D63, J28, J31working papers series
Date posted: July 12, 2010
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