Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638662
 
 

References (42)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Political Legitimacy


Avner Greif


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Steven Tadelis


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

July 11, 2010

Journal of Comparative Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pressure for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority? This paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral persistence. Crypto-morality is the secret adherence to one morality while practicing another in public. A simple overlapping generations model is developed to examine the conditions under which crypto-morality is practiced, decays and influences the direction of moral change. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of crypto-morality by discussing the moral foundations of political legitimacy in various historical episodes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Institutions, Moral beliefs, Crypto-morality, Political Legitimacy, Moral education, China, Islam

JEL Classification: D02, D10, D82, N30, N40, P16

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 12, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Greif, Avner and Tadelis, Steven, A Theory of Moral Persistence: Crypto-Morality and Political Legitimacy (July 11, 2010). Journal of Comparative Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1638662

Contact Information

Avner Greif (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-8936 (Phone)
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Steven Tadelis
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 900
Downloads: 215
Download Rank: 83,973
References:  42
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.344 seconds