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The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel CasesKorbinian Von BlanckenburgUniversity of Kassel Alexander Geistaffiliation not provided to SSRN Konstantin A. KholodilinGerman Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) May 1, 2010 DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1004 Abstract: In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20 Keywords: Cartel Detection, Collusion, Competition Policy JEL Classification: L10, L60 working papers seriesDate posted: July 13, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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