The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases
Korbinian von Blanckenburg
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Konstantin A. Kholodilin
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
May 1, 2010
DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1004
In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20
Keywords: Cartel Detection, Collusion, Competition Policy
JEL Classification: L10, L60
Date posted: July 13, 2010
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 1.703 seconds