Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640064
 
 

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SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter?


Rebecca Files


University of Texas at Dallas

June 28, 2011


Abstract:     
This study examines the conditions under which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises enforcement leniency following a restatement. I explore whether cooperation with SEC staff and forthright disclosure of a restatement (e.g., disclosures reported in a timely and visible manner) reduce the likelihood of an SEC sanction or SEC monetary penalties. After controlling for restatement severity, I find that cooperation increases the likelihood of being sanctioned, perhaps because it improves the SEC’s ability to build a successful case against the firm. However, cooperation and forthright disclosures are rewarded by the SEC through lower monetary penalties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: SEC enforcement actions, accounting restatements, cooperation, voluntary disclosure, press release prominence, AAERs, investigations

JEL Classification: G18, G38, K42, M41

working papers series





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Date posted: July 15, 2010 ; Last revised: June 29, 2011

Suggested Citation

Files, Rebecca, SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter? (June 28, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1640064

Contact Information

Rebecca Files (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Dallas ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
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