Political Control of Independent Agencies: Evidence from the FCC

Abstract:     
We use a unique and comprehensive data set, spanning 9385 orders and 36,787 individual Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commissioners’ votes over 35 years to examine the factors driving commissioner voting. Employing probit and logit choice models, we find (i) split government leads both to more dissenting as well as lower order output, suggesting congressional influence over the FCC; (ii) lame duck Presidential periods are correlated with higher order output; and, (iii) commissioners appear to use dissenting strategically to influence or signal judges reviewing FCC orders because dissenting increases with the percentage of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit appointed by a President of opposite party as the FCC Chair.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: FCC, Independent Agencies, Court of Appeals

JEL Classification: K23

working papers series