Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640624
 
 

References (20)



 


 



Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection


Samuel Issacharoff


New York University School of Law

July 15, 2010

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167 (2011)
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33

Abstract:     
Consumers make mistakes, and sophisticated market actors exploit those mistakes. Efforts to promote consumer protection through soft paternalistic interventions, most notably improved disclosure regimes, run into the problem that consumers are overwhelmed by information and may not to invest the time and effort necessary to take advantage of more information. This paper reviews recent attempts to protect consumers without recourse to command-and-control regulation. Instead of further overwhelming consumers with information, this paper proposes that efforts to aid beleaguered consumers should take the form of facilitating a market for intermediaries where independent agents or competitive firms have incentives to assist consumer protection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

JEL Classification: K12

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 15, 2010 ; Last revised: December 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Issacharoff, Samuel, Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection (July 15, 2010). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167 (2011); NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640624

Contact Information

Samuel Issacharoff (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6580 (Phone)
212-995-3150 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 652
Downloads: 166
Download Rank: 106,217
References:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.266 seconds