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MicroHoo: Deal Failure, Industry Rivalry, and Sources of Overbidding


Nihat Aktas


Skema Business School

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

September 17, 2012

Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
On February 1, 2008, Microsoft offered $43.7 billion for Yahoo. This offer was a milestone in the battle between Microsoft and Google to control the Internet search industry. The announcement accompanied a substantial decrease in Microsoft’s stock price. Investors apparently considered the bid too high and doubted Microsoft’s ability to create value with Yahoo’s assets (the announcement combined returns implied a total value destruction of $13.29 billion). Using the abnormal returns pattern of industry firms and customers, this article examines the sources of overbidding. Our analyses indicate that Microsoft’s aggressive move is rooted in its rivalry with Google, but the personality traits of the involved CEOs might explain also a portion of the overbidding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Merger theories, Abnormal returns, Irrational overbidding, Rational overbidding

JEL Classification: G34

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: July 17, 2010 ; Last revised: October 2, 2012

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat, De Bodt, Eric and Roll, Richard W., MicroHoo: Deal Failure, Industry Rivalry, and Sources of Overbidding (September 17, 2012). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641206

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas (Contact Author)
Skema Business School ( email )
Avenue Willy Brandt
EURAILLE (Lille), 59777
France
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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