Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641217
 
 

References (58)



 
 

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Revolving Door Lobbyists


Jordi Blanes i Vidal


London School of Economics

Mirko Draca


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Christian Fons-Rosen


Universitat Pompeu Fabra

July 16, 2010

5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
Washington's `revolving door' -the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political Elites

JEL Classification: H11, J24, J45

working papers series


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Date posted: July 17, 2010 ; Last revised: April 14, 2013

Suggested Citation

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian, Revolving Door Lobbyists (July 16, 2010). 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641217

Contact Information

Jordi Blanes i Vidal (Contact Author)
London School of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 779 51 61 034 (Phone)
Mirko Draca
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+20 7955 7010 (Phone)
Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )
124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Christian Fons-Rosen
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
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