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Revolving Door LobbyistsJordi Blanes i VidalLondon School of Economics Mirko DracaLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Christian Fons-RosenUniversitat Pompeu Fabra July 16, 2010 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper Abstract: Washington's `revolving door' -the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 58 Keywords: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political Elites JEL Classification: H11, J24, J45 working papers seriesDate posted: July 17, 2010 ; Last revised: April 14, 2013Suggested CitationContact Information
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