Abstract

 
 

References (51)



 
 

Citations (6)



 


 



Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes


Chen Lin


Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

Micah S. Officer


Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems

Hong Zou


City University of Hong Kong

July 18, 2010

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We examine the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: D&O Insurance, Merger and Acquisition

JEL Classification: G14, G22, G34

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 18, 2010 ; Last revised: July 23, 2011

Suggested Citation

Lin, Chen, Officer, Micah S. and Zou, Hong, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (July 18, 2010). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641645

Contact Information

Chen Lin
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
Micah S. Officer (Contact Author)
Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States
Hong Zou
City University of Hong Kong ( email )
Kowloon, AK Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,153
Downloads: 254
Download Rank: 58,183
References:  51
Citations:  6

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.625 seconds