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Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition OutcomesChen LinChinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance Micah S. OfficerLoyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems Hong ZouCity University of Hong Kong July 18, 2010 Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming Abstract: We examine the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: D&O Insurance, Merger and Acquisition JEL Classification: G14, G22, G34 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: July 18, 2010 ; Last revised: July 23, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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