Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642310
 


 



Organized Business, Affiliated Labor, and Competition Policy Reform in Developing Democracies


Stephen J. Weymouth


Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy

2010

APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper

Abstract:     
One of the enduring lessons of the global financial crisis is that regulatory laxity heightens systemic risk. This paper examines the political sources of regulatory laxity, highlighting the influence of interest groups on governments' commitments to competition (antitrust) regulation in democracies. I argue that competition policy enforcement reflects the relative political strength of two contending groups. A rent-preserving alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor ("insiders") opposes competition policies that erode its market dominance. A pro-competition coalition of consumers, unorganized workers, and entrepreneurs ("outsiders") favors regulatory oversight. A simple model illustrates that policymakers' commitments to competition policy vary according to the distributive effects of reform. Where insiders are concentrated and encompassing, commitments to antitrust regulatory reform are weakened. To test the propositions, I create an original dataset measuring competition agency design over the period 1975-2007. The results, which are robust to multiple specifications and instrumental variables, suggest that anticompetitive interest groups slow the reform process and weaken governments' commitments to a robust regulatory regime.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Competition Policy, Regulation, Democracy, Rent-Seeking, Economic Development

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 19, 2010 ; Last revised: March 30, 2012

Suggested Citation

Weymouth, Stephen J., Organized Business, Affiliated Labor, and Competition Policy Reform in Developing Democracies (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642310

Contact Information

Stephen J. Weymouth (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.msb.edu/sw439/

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 329
Downloads: 48

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.437 seconds