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Some Experimental Results for a Quantal Response Bargaining Model of WarDavid H. ClarkBinghamton University Timothy Nordstromaffiliation not provided to SSRN Katri SiebergUniversity of Tampere William L. ReedRice University - Department of Political Science Charles A. HoltUniversity of Virginia - Department of Economics 2010 APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper Abstract: We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium predictions from both a complete information version of the model and the quantal response version of the model. We discuss how the results from the experiments can inform future theoretical, empirical, and experimental work on bargaining theories of war.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33 working papers seriesDate posted: July 19, 2010 ; Last revised: September 5, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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