Some Experimental Results for a Quantal Response Bargaining Model of War
David H. Clark
affiliation not provided to SSRN
University of Tampere
William L. Reed
Rice University - Department of Political Science
Charles A. Holt
University of Virginia - Department of Economics
APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium predictions from both a complete information version of the model and the quantal response version of the model. We discuss how the results from the experiments can inform future theoretical, empirical, and experimental work on bargaining theories of war.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33working papers series
Date posted: July 19, 2010 ; Last revised: September 5, 2010
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