Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1644995
 
 

References (159)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Blockholder Compensation, Activism, and Efficacy


Christopher P. Clifford


University of Kentucky

Laura Anne Lindsey


Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department

August 25, 2011


Abstract:     
We examine the relation between blockholder presence and firm performance with a focus on the inherent differences in organizational form and the stated intent among large shareholders. Using hand-collected information on blockholdings for a panel of S&P 1500 firms, we find that firms targeted by blockholders with organizational forms typically associated with performance-sensitive compensation or who file as active experience subsequent improvements in operating and stock price performance. Controlling for the endogeneity of blockholder presence and type, we observe no such improvements for firms targeted by blockholders with weaker compensation incentives or those taking a passive role. Moreover, performance effects are stronger for firms where information asymmetries are more pronounced and for firms with better corporate governance, indicating that, while outside blockholders may serve as a substitute for other monitoring mechanisms, it does not appear that they can fully compensate for shortcomings in governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 19, 2010 ; Last revised: August 28, 2011

Suggested Citation

Clifford, Christopher P. and Lindsey, Laura Anne, Blockholder Compensation, Activism, and Efficacy (August 25, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1644995 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1644995

Contact Information

Christopher P. Clifford
University of Kentucky ( email )
College of Business & Economics
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
United States
859-257-3850 (Phone)
Laura Anne Lindsey (Contact Author)
Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department ( email )
W. P. Carey School of Business
PO Box 873906
Tempe, AZ 85287-3906
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,135
Downloads: 233
Download Rank: 74,636
References:  159
Citations:  2
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Blockholders and Corporate Governance
By Alex Edmans

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.625 seconds