References (39)


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Real Estate Mergers: Corporate Control & Shareholder Wealth

Kiplan S. Womack

UNC Charlotte

May 29, 2010

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2012

This study contributes new evidence to distinguish why mergers occur in the real estate industry by quantifying the combined firm return for nearly three decades of real estate mergers. As a measure of the overall change in shareholder wealth created by a merger, the combined firm return plays a key role in differentiating competing merger theories and is quantified for the real estate industry for the first time. Findings from this study are consistent with the notion that real estate mergers occur because firms with superior management acquire other firms that possess unexploited opportunities to cut costs and increase earnings (the inefficient management hypothesis). Furthermore, the results indicate that real estate mergers generally create wealth, as shareholders at best realize modest gains and at worst break even.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: merger, acquisitions, Real Estate Investment Trusts, REITs

JEL Classification: G34, G14, L85

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Date posted: July 21, 2010 ; Last revised: January 26, 2016

Suggested Citation

Womack, Kiplan S., Real Estate Mergers: Corporate Control & Shareholder Wealth (May 29, 2010). Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645964

Contact Information

Kiplan S. Womack (Contact Author)
UNC Charlotte ( email )
9201 University City Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States
704.687.7584 (Phone)
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References:  39
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