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American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era


George Deltas


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Konstantinos Serfes


Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business

Richard A. Sicotte


University of Vermont - Department of Economics

March 1999


Abstract:     
This paper surveys the formation of the US shipping cartels (conferences) and their state of development before the onset of World War I. These cartels ranged from simple price agreements to very complex and tight revenue pooling agreements. The focus of the paper is to identify the factors that influence the choice of the cartel organizational form. We find that the degree of collusion is higher in routes in which entry of competing firms is less likely, in routes with fewer firms of relative unequal size, and in routes in which member firms have large global capacity. We also find that multi-market contact facilitates collusion, i.e., a cartel is more likely to be "tight" if its members are also interacting in many other routes. These results indicate that complex cartels, as opposed to simple rate agreements, are formed when organizational costs are lower and enforcement easier and more credible.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

JEL Classification: L41, N70, N71, L92

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Date posted: May 24, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Deltas, George, Serfes, Konstantinos and Sicotte, Richard A., American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era (March 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=164608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.164608

Contact Information

George Deltas (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
450 Commerce West
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-4586 (Phone)
217-244-6678 (Fax)
Konstantinos Serfes
Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business ( email )
3141 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-6816 (Phone)
215-895-6975 (Fax)
Richard A. Sicotte
University of Vermont - Department of Economics ( email )
347 Old Mill
Burlington, VT 05405-4160
United States
802-006-0184 (Phone)
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