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The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations


Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz


Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

July 21, 2010


Abstract:     
Screens based on data can be important tools to detect conspiracies of various types and have started to be used by Competition Authorities worldwide to actively detect such behavior (Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2009)). Screens can also be used during prosecution and penalization stages. Screens have been developed and implemented to search for a wide variety of competition problems, including bid rigging, price fixing, stock prices and commodities prices manipulations, revenues management, market allocation schemes, and stock options backdating. There are four desirable properties of a good screen: (i) it should minimize the number of false positives and negatives; (ii) it should be easy to implement; (iii) it should be costly for agents to disguise such behavior; and (iv) the screen should have empirical support. In this article we discuss two examples of investigations in accounting and financial markets triggered by the use of empirical screens: stock options backdating and odd-eights avoidance by NASDAQ dealers. We then present the results from screens applied to a potential Libor rate conspiracy and manipulation and question whether such findings would suffice to trigger an investigation into the matter.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: Screens, Conspiracies, Manipulations, Detection, Investigations

JEL Classification: C32, K21, K22

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Date posted: July 23, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations (July 21, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646628

Contact Information

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz (Contact Author)
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
22 Cortlandt Street
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10007
United States
(917) 499-4944 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
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