Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648029
 
 

References (24)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



An Economic Analysis of Libel Law


Manoj Dalvi


Long Island University - Department of Finance

James F. Refalo


California State University, Los Angeles

2008

Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 34, Issue 1, pp. 74-94, 2008

Abstract:     
This paper examines the welfare implications of different libel law standards as applied to newspapers in publishing stories. Our work extends the current literature by permitting private and public incentives to deviate, giving rise to an agency problem, and by formulating a two-stage decision model based on a story's expected value. We show that the negligence standard provides incentives for the agent to take actions, merely to insure itself against liability. This results in a deadweight loss to society. We also show that both standards can be socially inefficient; however, correction using policy tools under strict liability places a lower informational burden on policy makers, than does the negligence standard.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 27, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Dalvi, Manoj and Refalo, James F., An Economic Analysis of Libel Law (2008). Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 34, Issue 1, pp. 74-94, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648029 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eej.9050003

Contact Information

Manoj Dalvi (Contact Author)
Long Island University - Department of Finance ( email )
720 Northern Blvd.
Brookville, NY 11548
United States
516-299-2308 (Phone)
James F. Refalo
California State University, Los Angeles ( email )
Los Angeles, CA
United States
HOME PAGE: http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/jrefalo/
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  24
Citations:  1

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