Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648948
 
 

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Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust


Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz


Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Patrick Bajari


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Joe Murphy


Independent

July 26, 2010


Abstract:     
One of the prime issues in the antitrust and competition law1 compliance field is how to deal with the risk of collusive or cartel behavior which involves willful violations of the law. In the past much of antitrust compliance work has focused on training, perhaps accompanied by an antitrust compliance manual. But regardless of the amount of employee training they conduct and the existence of written materials, it is likely that most practitioners feel they do not have a handle on this area of risk. In this paper we discuss the role that empirical screens for conspiracies and manipulations can play in assisting compliance programs, by looking at certain quantifiable red flags and applying statistical analysis to determine priority areas which merit further focus.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Screens, Conspiracies, Manipulations, Detection, Investigations, Compliance Programs, Internal Monitoring

JEL Classification: C32, K21, K22

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Date posted: July 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. and Bajari, Patrick and Murphy, Joe, Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust (July 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1648948

Contact Information

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz (Contact Author)
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
22 Cortlandt Street
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10007
United States
(917) 499-4944 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
Patrick Bajari
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics ( email )
266 Lorch Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-763-5319 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~bajari/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Joseph E. Murphy
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
United States
Feedback to SSRN


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1. Why and How to Use Empirical Screens in Antitrust Compliance
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