Legal Judgments as Plural Acceptances of Norms
San Francisco State University
February 1, 2010
Oxford Studies in the Philosopy of Law, Vol. 1, 2010
In this paper, I propose an expressivist analysis of internal legal statements that is a development of the analysis I find in H.L.A. Hart’s writings. My analysis portrays a speaker of an internal legal statement as aiming at initiation or maintenance of a certain form of coordination with his audience. More specifically, I argue that an utterance of an internal legal statement is an expression of a conditional conative attitude by which the speaker displays his willingness to act in a particular way on the assumption that others have like or mirroring conditional commitments. Some have argued that expressivist analyses do not distinguish normative statements sufficiently clearly from attempts to goad or prod the audience in various non-rational ways. My analysis enables us to make this distinction quite clearly, and also thereby enables us to maintain Hart’s view that legal practices are fundamentally different from the kind of coercion-centered practices that Jeremy Bentham and John Austin conceived legal practices as being.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 2, 2010 ; Last revised: August 18, 2010
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.547 seconds