Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance
Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), 55(2-3): 225-250 (April-May 2013)
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 84
56 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2010 Last revised: 11 Mar 2016
Date Written: January 13, 2013
Abstract
Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.
Keywords: board of director networks, analyst forecasts, market efficiency
JEL Classification: G3, G14, L14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation