Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Sweden
B. Espen Eckbo
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
Central Bank of Norway
August 1, 2010
Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2010-79
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 173/2011
Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report on Sweden is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The first report, on Italy, is in Eckbo, Paone and Urheim (2009). Our Swedish report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Sweden. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempts to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide empirical evidence on how Swedish listed firms have adapted to Sweden's share-voting system.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 231
Keywords: Share Voting, Shareholder Rights Directive, Corporate Governance, Hare Holding System, Corporate Law
JEL Classification: K22
Date posted: August 1, 2010 ; Last revised: February 18, 2011
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