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Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Sweden


B. Espen Eckbo


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Giulia Paone


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business

Runa Urheim


Central Bank of Norway

August 1, 2010

Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2010-79
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 173/2011

Abstract:     
Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report on Sweden is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The first report, on Italy, is in Eckbo, Paone and Urheim (2009). Our Swedish report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Sweden. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempts to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide empirical evidence on how Swedish listed firms have adapted to Sweden's share-voting system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 231

Keywords: Share Voting, Shareholder Rights Directive, Corporate Governance, Hare Holding System, Corporate Law

JEL Classification: K22

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Date posted: August 1, 2010 ; Last revised: February 18, 2011

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen and Paone, Giulia and Urheim, Runa, Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Sweden (August 1, 2010). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2010-79; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 173/2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1651582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1651582

Contact Information

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/eckbo
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Giulia Paone
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
Runa Urheim
Central Bank of Norway ( email )
P.O. Box 1179
Oslo, N-0107
Norway
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