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Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on SwedenB. Espen EckboDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Giulia PaoneDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business Runa UrheimCentral Bank of Norway August 1, 2010 Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2010-79 ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 173/2011 Abstract: Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report on Sweden is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The first report, on Italy, is in Eckbo, Paone and Urheim (2009). Our Swedish report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Sweden. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempts to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide empirical evidence on how Swedish listed firms have adapted to Sweden's share-voting system.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 231 Keywords: Share Voting, Shareholder Rights Directive, Corporate Governance, Hare Holding System, Corporate Law JEL Classification: K22 working papers seriesDate posted: August 1, 2010 ; Last revised: February 18, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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