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Ownership and Control Structure, Corporate Governance and Income Smoothing in Brazil


Damiana Torres


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Adriano Leal Bruni


Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

Antonio Lopo Martinez


FUCAPE Business School

Miguel Angel Rivera


Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

August 1, 2010


Abstract:     
Income smoothing is a longstanding practice under the more general category of earnings management. As the name suggests, it consists of smoothing out the fluctuations of the income series. This article examines the association between the ownership and control structure, level of corporate governance and origin of capital (foreign or domestic) of Brazilian companies on their propensity to smooth income. Using a sample of nonfinancial firms with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) at the end of 2007, we performed covariance analysis based on data from the preceding ten years, where the dependent variable was the index proposed by Eckel, an empirical proxy for smoothing. The results indicate that the more concentrated the shareholding and control structures of Brazilian firms are, both according to overall capital and voting capital, the more intensely they tend to smooth earnings to favor the interests of the majority shareholder. The results also show that this effect is less pronounced for firms with enhanced corporate governance levels and those with foreign capital.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Ownership and control structure, corporate governance, income smoothing

JEL Classification: M41, M49, G34, G38

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Date posted: August 1, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Torres, Damiana, Bruni, Adriano Leal , Martinez, Antonio Lopo and Rivera, Miguel Angel, Ownership and Control Structure, Corporate Governance and Income Smoothing in Brazil (August 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1651991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1651991

Contact Information

Damiana Torres
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Adriano Leal Bruni
Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) ( email )
Av. Reitor Miguel Calmon, s/n
Vale do Canela
Salvador, Bahia
Brazil
Antonio Lopo Martinez (Contact Author)
FUCAPE Business School ( email )
Fernando Ferrari Avenue, 1358
Goiabeiras
Vitória, Espirtio Santo 29075-010
Brazil
Miguel Angel Rivera
Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) ( email )
Av. Reitor Miguel Calmon, s/n
Vale do Canela
Salvador, Bahia
Brazil
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