On the Optimal Allocation of Power between Shareholders and Managers
University of Southern California
August 5, 2010
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-12
23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010 Paper
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 10-13
The question of how to allocate power between managers and shareholders, while intensely debated, remains unresolved among scholars and policymakers. This paper contributes to this debate by formally investigating the optimal allocation of power for shareholders recognizing that they may be heterogeneous, and that agency problems exist with managers. In the model, I treat shareholders as economic actors who choose decision rules (or the degree of management insulation) under a veil of ignorance with the goal of maximizing their utility. Managers choose their consumption of private benefits based on the insulation levels chosen by shareholders. I demonstrate that shareholders face a trade-off when choosing the level of managerial power. High insulation is desirable because it prevents other minority shareholders from blocking potentially profitable investments. Low insulation level is desirable because it prevents other shareholders from approving potentially unprofitable investments, as well as reducing agency costs. I discuss how optimal insulation changes if we relax assumptions about shareholder heterogeneity and the presence of agency costs.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: Shareholders, voting rules, managers, corporate governance
JEL Classification: D72, G34, G38, K22working papers series
Date posted: August 6, 2010 ; Last revised: November 12, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.312 seconds