Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654306
 
 

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A Study of Non-Neutral Networks


Eitan Altman


Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA)

Pierre Bernhard


Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA)

George Kesidis


Pennsylvania State University

Sulan Wong


University of Coruña - Faculty of Law

Julio Rojas-Mora


University of Barcelona - Department of Business Economics and Organization

August 6, 2010


Abstract:     
Hahn and Wallsten wrote that net neutrality "usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of being non-neutral, particularly by charging the content providers. Using game theoretic tools, we show that by adding the option for the service providers to charge the content providers, not only may the content providers and the internauts suffer, but also the access provider's performance degrades.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Keywords: Network neutrality, side payments, game theory

JEL Classification: C72, L50, D40, L96

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Date posted: August 8, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Altman, Eitan and Bernhard, Pierre and Kesidis, George and Wong, Sulan and Rojas-Mora, Julio, A Study of Non-Neutral Networks (August 6, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1654306

Contact Information

Eitan Altman
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA) ( email )
BP93 2004 Route des Lucioles
Sophia Antipolis Cedex, 06902
France
Pierre Bernhard
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA) ( email )
Rocquencourt
George Kesidis
Pennsylvania State University ( email )
University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States
Sulan Wong
University of Coruña - Faculty of Law ( email )
Campus de Elviña
A Coruña, 15071
Spain
Julio Rojas-Mora (Contact Author)
University of Barcelona - Department of Business Economics and Organization ( email )
Edificio Principal, Torre 2 - 3a planta
Av. Diagonal, 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/jcredberry/
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