Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs
University of Illinois
INSEAD - Finance
Christian C. P. Wolff
University of Luxembourg - Luxembourg School of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
December 23, 2011
INSEAD Working Paper No. 2011/133/FIN
This paper introduces, analyzes, and values a new form of contingent convertible (CoCo), a Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC). Issued as a bond, it converts to new shareholders’ equity if a bank’s market value of capital falls below a pre-specified trigger. The COERC avoids the problems with market based triggers such as “death spirals” as a result of manipulation or panic. A bank that issues COERCs also has a smaller incentive to choose investments that are subject to large losses. Furthermore, COERCs reduce the problem of “debt overhang,” the disincentive to replenish shareholders’ equity following a decline. The low risk of COERCS should increase their appeal to risk-averse bondholders.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 54working papers series
Date posted: May 4, 2011 ; Last revised: December 23, 2011
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