Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange
Matthew O. Jackson
Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality
Stanford University - Department of Economics
August 7, 2011
American Economic Review, 2012, 102(5): 1857-97.
We examine the informal exchange of favors in societies such that any two individuals interact too infrequently to sustain exchange, but such that the social pressure of the possible loss of multiple relationships can sustain exchange. Patterns of exchange that are locally enforceable and renegotiation-proof necessitate that all links are "supported": any two individuals exchanging favors have a common friend. In symmetric settings, such robust networks are "social quilts": tree-like unions of completely connected subnetworks. Examining favor exchange networks in 75 villages in rural India, we find high levels of support and identify characteristics that correlate with support.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: Social Networks, social capital, favor exchange, support, social quilts, renegotiation-proof
JEL Classification: D85, C72, L14, Z13, O12Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 11, 2010 ; Last revised: January 3, 2013
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