Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657130
 
 

References (97)



 
 

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Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange


Matthew O. Jackson


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer


Autonomous University of Barcelona

Xu Tan


University of Washington - Economics

August 7, 2011

American Economic Review, 2012, 102(5): 1857-97.

Abstract:     
We examine the informal exchange of favors in societies such that any two individuals interact too infrequently to sustain exchange, but such that the social pressure of the possible loss of multiple relationships can sustain exchange. Patterns of exchange that are locally enforceable and renegotiation-proof necessitate that all links are "supported": any two individuals exchanging favors have a common friend. In symmetric settings, such robust networks are "social quilts": tree-like unions of completely connected subnetworks. Examining favor exchange networks in 75 villages in rural India, we find high levels of support and identify characteristics that correlate with support.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Social Networks, social capital, favor exchange, support, social quilts, renegotiation-proof

JEL Classification: D85, C72, L14, Z13, O12

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Date posted: August 11, 2010 ; Last revised: January 3, 2013

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás and Tan, Xu, Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange (August 7, 2011). American Economic Review, 2012, 102(5): 1857-97.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657130

Contact Information

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm
Santa Fe Institute
1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer
Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )
CAMPUS BELLATERRA
Cerdanyola del Vallès, BARCELONA 08193
Spain
Xu Tan
University of Washington - Economics ( email )
Seattle, WA
United States
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