Discrimination and Assimilation

Abstract:     
In a heterogeneous society with two social groups with competing social norms, members of the relatively worse-off group face an incentive to adopt the social norms of the better-off group and assimilate into it. I present a theory in which the cost of assimilation is endogenous, strategically chosen by the better off group in order to screen those who wish to assimilate. In equilibrium, only high types who generate positive externalities to the members of the better-off group assimilate. In an application of the theory, I show that the “acting white” phenomenon in which students of a disadvantaged ethnic group punish peers who succeed academically can be explained as an optimal strategy on the part of untalented students to try to keep their more able peers in their community.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Assimilation, discrimination, social groups, acting white

JEL Classification: J15, D71

working papers series