The Vertical Dimension of Cooperative Competition Policy
James Ming Chen
University of Louisville - Louis D. Brandeis School of Law
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, p. 1005, 2003
University of Louisville School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Competition policy in the United States is formed at multiple levels, and the sovereigns that formulate this policy often clash with each other. A phalanx of state laws must be reconciled with federal policies designed to ensure a nationwide common market. The United States uses two bodies of law to reconcile federalism with a national policy favoring interstate competition. These two approaches - antitrust immunity and the dormant commerce clause - are antagonistic in practically every important detail. Whereas antitrust immunity protects state and local freedom to restrain trade, the dormant commerce clause adopts precisely the opposite solution of protecting a national interest in free trade. The tension between these bodies of law parallels the fundamental dilemma of international competition policy. The American experience in coordinating its conflicting sources of competition policy therefore informs comparable efforts in the European Union and on the world stage.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Policy, Trade
JEL Classification: K21Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 13, 2010
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