Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658193
 
 

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All-in-Auctions for Water


David Zetland


Aguanomics Solutions; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

November 11, 2012

PERC Research Paper No. 12/15

Abstract:     
This paper proposes a novel mechanism for reallocating temporary water flows or permanent water rights. The All-in-Auction (AiA) increases efficiency and social welfare by reallocating water without harming water rights holders. AiAs can be used to allocate variable or diminished flows among traditional or new uses. AiAs are appropriate for use within larger organizations that distribute water among members, e.g., irrigation districts or wholesale water agencies. Members would decide when and how to use AiAs, i.e., when transaction costs are high, environmental constraints are binding, or allocation to outsiders is desired. Experimental sessions show that an AiA reallocates more units with no less efficiency that traditional two-sided auctions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: multi-unit auction, scarcity, water allocation, auction design, endowment effect

JEL Classification: D02, D44, Q25

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Date posted: August 14, 2010 ; Last revised: November 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Zetland, David, All-in-Auctions for Water (November 11, 2012). PERC Research Paper No. 12/15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658193

Contact Information

David Zetland (Contact Author)
Aguanomics Solutions ( email )
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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References:  58

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