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Management Control Practices and Relative Bargaining Power – The Interrelationships and Dynamics


Pingli Li


Middlesex University Business School

Guliang Tang


University of International Business and Economics

Hirosh Okano


Independent

Gao Chen


Independent

July 25, 2010

AAA 2011 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper

Abstract:     
This paper examines the characteristics of management controls exercised by parents and the ways such controls could be shaped by relative bargaining power of parents in international joint ventures (IJVs). Adopting an in-depth case study method in a large automotive IJV formed between a Chinese and Japanese partner, the study focuses on not just what but also how management controls have been exercised in the case company. The paper contributes to the literature on management controls and IJVs by providing systematic study of the interrelationships between the multiple dimensions of management controls, through which a shared but split control style was identified. In addition, it provides the first observation of the evolutionary changes in management controls due to the dynamics of relative bargaining power, and of the ways exercising relative bargaining power mediates the extent of control between the partners. The findings also have important implications concerning how to enhance the effectiveness of management controls over IJVs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Management controls, Bargaining power, International joint venture, China, Automotive Industry

JEL Classification: C78, D23, F23, L62, M41

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Date posted: August 16, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Li, Pingli, Tang, Guliang, Okano, Hirosh and Chen, Gao, Management Control Practices and Relative Bargaining Power – The Interrelationships and Dynamics (July 25, 2010). AAA 2011 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658281

Contact Information

Pingli Li (Contact Author)
Middlesex University Business School ( email )
The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom
Guliang Tang
University of International Business and Economics ( email )
No. 10, Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District
Beijing, 100029
China
Hirosh Okano
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
Gao Chen
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
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