Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy Across Political Regimes
Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7959
This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local level data on unemployment rate and political competition to obtain an empirical specification which matches our model. First, we test the effect of electoral incentives under majority rule, by analyzing the US House representatives voting records on the 2009 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act, which increased unemployment benefit coverage and generosity. Second, we exploit the time-varying dimension of our theoretical prediction to test the causal effect on panel data. We use a dataset with local information on electoral competitiveness and unemployment rates for 29 OECD countries in 1980-2001 and employ panel analysis on different measures of UB generosity. The empirical evidence strongly supports our theoretical predictions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: Economic Policy, Electoral Rules, Pivotal Districts, Unemployment Benefits
JEL Classification: D72, D78, H53, J65working papers series
Date posted: August 16, 2010
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